3.5(c)

29 October 1960

Copy No. C 75

# CENTRAL

# INTELLIGENCE

# BULLETIN



DECEMENT NO. 5/
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 


[] ECCLASSITION
CLASS. CLAUSED TO: TS S
NEXT FEVILW DATE: 20/0
ANTH: HR TO 2

HATO JUN 1980 HEVIEWERS

### TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03179292

1			



Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03179292

### CENTRAL INTER GENCE BULLETIN

2. di diser 1980

DARE BRIEF

#### I. THE CONTUNIST BLOC

North Vietnam - Calla No	rth Vietnam will follow North
Moroa and Communist Cana to	become the third Asian Com-
munist nation recognized by Cu	ioa. Relations will be estab-
lished at the ambassadorial lev	:al,
	Havana has suggested a joint
announcement of the move on I	5 November. North Vietnam
has consular posts in Burma, In	donesia, and India, but Guinea
is the only nonbloc nation to wh	ich a North Vietnamese ambas-
sador is presently accreated.	
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	

#### II. AMA-AFRICA

Iraq: The growing lack of confidence in Qasim's leadership has engendered reports that he may be faced with wholesale cabinet resignations. Politicians and military personnel
in the government have become increasingly reluctant to continue association with what they believe to be a failing regime.
This situation may encourage action by antiregime civilian and
military elements reported to be engaged in coup plotting.

Algeria: Rebel terrorists are expected to create disorders on I November, the sixth anniversary of the rebellion, which could provoke counteraction by the Europeans. Tension has increased in Algiers, and French officials there also fear demonstrations in reaction to the trial of Pierre Lagaillarde, leader of the January rightist rebellion, which begins in Paris on 3 November. Rightist elements may want to stage a show of strength prior to De Gaulle's television speech scheduled for 4 November.

\*Republic of the Congo: The Leopoldville representatives of some of Lumumba's principal supporters are discussing possible ways of bringing pressure to bear for the return of Lumumba to power. that all Moroccan General Kettani has stated African states should adopt a resolution to withdraw their forces from the Congo. Calling this the "only solution," he referred to Mobutu as a "hollow drum" and intimated that such a resolution would cause Mobutu's eclipse. the Guinean ambassador expressed his full approval of the suggestion of a collective resolution on withdrawal. It appears unlikely, however, that such a resolution would receive general (Page 3) African support.

ok deletel P'N142

29 Oct 60

DAILY BRIEF

ii

TOP SECRET

The Cuban Foreign is attry instructed its embassy in Moscow on 25 October is a proval from the North Vietnamese Government for a latter between Cuba and North Vietnam on the ambassa and level. Havana suggested that the communique be issued as 15 November. North Vietnamese consular posts in Burner Indenesia, and India, but Guinea is the only nonbloc ration to which a North Vietnamese ambassador is presently accorded. Hanoi will view establishment of its first diplomatic post in the western hemisphere as a major breakthrough it is campaign for greater international acceptance.

Recognition of North Managin a further move by Cuba toward solidarity with the Pho-Soviet bloc. Cuba will then have diplomatic relations with all Sino-Soviet countries except Albania, Mongolia, and Bast Germany. It has concluded an interbank economic agreement with East Germany, and diplomatic recognition may be imminent. The most recent economic agreement made to Cuba with a bloc country was signed on 25 October with Bonda and was the eighth trade and technical assistance and most concluded this year with a bloc country. Cuban Halbaral Pink President Guevara, now on a mission to five him countries, is expected to sign a trade agreement with North Korea next month.

Cuban Army Inspector Coneral William Galvez visited Manoi last May. In September a North Vietnamese party central committee member attaining an academic conference in Mexico announced his intention to visit Cuba, but the visit apparently never materialized. Earlier this month the North Vietnamese, through their ambassy in Moscow, expressed their desire to send a government delegation to Cuba on a goodwill visit. This group may be on hand when recognition is publicly announced.

North Vietnam may agree to supply small quantities of rice to Cuba under a token trade agreement between the two countries. Cuba previously was considering the purchase of rice from South Vietnam, but probably will switch this order to Hanoi following the establishment of diplomatic relations. A small quantity of North Vietnamese rice has already been shipped to Cuba on Soviet account, and several shipments are being scheduled from Communist China.

#### Tension Mountin Algeria

Tension in Algeria, particularly in the capital, has increased, and new terrorist outbreaks by the Algerian rebels or antigovernment demonstrations by European opponents of De Gaulle's Algerian policies may occur next week.

The sixth anniversary of the outbreak of the rebellion is 1 November, at which time rebel terrorists, whose capabilities are still considerable, are expected to cause as much trouble as possible. Any flagrantly violent acts would probably provoke the European population into countermoves—possibly lynchings or other mob action.

The prosecutor general in Algiers expects trouble in reaction to the trial of Pierre Lagaillarde, leader of the right-ist rebellion in Algiers last January, which begins in Paris on 3 November and will last about five weeks. The prosecutor general said that he was concerned about a "repetition of last January."

Rightist elements in Algiers may also be disturbed about the radio-television speech De Gaulle is to give on 4 November, and may decide to stage a show of strength as a warning against any liberal proposals on the Algerian problem. The scheduling of the speech was unexpected, and it may contain another appeal to the French people to support his Algerian policy. Press reports this week have said that De Gaulle plans a referendum in France, possibly by 16 December, before setting up an autonomous Algerian government, and that he has warned the commander in chief in Algeria, General Crepin, not to oppose his policies.

Activist groups in Algiers such as veterans' organiza-
tions and the Home Guard reportedly have made plans to
seize key government installations, such as the radio sta-
tion and the power plant, sometime before 4 November.
Only the extremist members of these groups appear ready
for action, however, and although they might be able to cap-
ture some installations, they could not hold them without
active military support, which is not now evident.7

SECRET\_

#### The Situation in the Congo

The Dictation in the Confe
Moroccan General Kettani, deputy commander of the UN forces in the Congo, has stated that all African states should adopt a resolution to withdraw their forces from the Congo,
Kettani characterized Mobutu as a "hollow drum" and hinted that a UN withdrawal would return the Congo to chaos and bring about his downfall. Although the UAR ambassador was noncommittal concerning Kettani's plan, in forwarding it to Cairo he stated that the Guinean ambassador had given it his "full approval."
It appears doubtful whether African states favorable to Lumumba would take any action such as a troop withdrawal which would preclude their intervening on Lumumba's behalf if it were deemed necessary. They might, however, threaten a withdrawal as a protest against the UN's unwillingness to restore Lumumba to power. The UAR ambassador deplored to Kettani the situation in which "Moroccan, UAR, and African forces had undertaken the work of Mobutu's forces while leaving him freedom to maneuver in Leopoldville." Both Cairo and Accra have criticized UN action in transferring their contingents from Leopoldville to the Congo interior after Mobutu and others complained of their political activity on Lumumba's behalf.
While the situation in Leopoldville has quieted somewhat following the withdrawal of most of Mobutu's troops from the city, relations between President Tshombé and UN officials in Katanga remain critical. Although Tshombé has not yet moved to carry out his threat to eject senior UN officials there, he continues dissatisfied with the UN's failure to curb raids in the interior by Baluba tribesmen, and remains critical of the responsible UN officials.

TOP SECRET

### Recent Communist Activities Affecting the Level of World Tension (for the period 23-29 October 1960)

(Further treatment of each item cited below can be found in the referenced publication; classification indicated is that of the full peice in its original form.)

While continuing to attack Western policies on disarmament, nuclear testing, and Berlin, Moscow has initiated moves
designed to set the stage for a new effort at negotiations on
these issues.
an early walkout from the disarmament discussions in the UN Political Committee. The USSR may feel that this will force the West to agree to a special General Assembly session on
disarmament early next spring.
Berlin: Khrushchev has again committed himself to some kind of a "solution"negotiated or unilateralof the Berlin problem within a time limit, in this case 1961. The current Communist encroachment tactics in the area of West German - West Berlin relations are likely to continue and intensify, but Moscow will be careful to maintain control of East German actions in order to hold the risk of hostilities to a minimum.
Moscow and Peiping have apparently had no success in their latest attempts to conciliate their views prior to the planned meeting of world Communist leaders in Moscow next month.
Che Guevara's economic mission has left Cuba for the USSR, Communist China, and other bloc states to arrange for next year's trade with these countries and to further

integrate Cuba economically with the bloc. Soviet propaganda coverage of the Cuban situation has been stepped up and now includes daily warnings of alleged American plans for "counter-revolutionary invasions," along with denunciations of US trade restrictions.
the USSR is ready to extend large-scale economic aid of "any type" and "without any conditions" to Turkey and is prepared to show its good will by reducing the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and naval installations in the area.
Moscow's expanding aid program in Guinea will include the supply of additional military equipment and increased as- sistance for establishing state farms,
Cambodia may soon sign an agreement for Czech mili- tary equipment.

TOP SECRET

#### THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

#### **CONFIDENTIAL**

Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03179292